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INTRODUCTION

Peter Bakeas, a thirty-three-year-old Greek citizen living in West
Lynn, Massachusetts and working in an entry-level position at the
First National Bank of Greece in Massachusetts, developed a cocaine
habit he could not afford.1 Mounting debt from his cocaine habit
pressured him to find alternative means for obtaining income.
Bakeas, using his position at First National Bank of Greece, began to

* I am deeply grateful for the support of my mother, Marilyn Bent, and the helpful
comments of Jennifer Boatwright.

1. The facts described in this paragraph are taken from United States v. Bakeas, 9f!:/ F.
Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1997).
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embezzle money from the accounts of a distant relative and some
family friends. When his scheme was discovered, he confessed and
made arrangements to repay the money he had taken. Bakeas pled
guilty to embezzlement by a bank officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
656.2 It was his first offense. Normally, under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of this crime under
these circumstances and with no criminal record would be sentenced
to three years of probation, twelve months of which would be served
in a community confinement center. A community confinement
center is a minimum security facility that allows inmates a more
normal life and more contact with the community than a typical
prison. According to Federal Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") policy,
however, an alien like Bakeas would not have been placed in one of
these community centers, but rather would have been placed in a
medium security prison - a decidedly more punitive environment. In
Bakeas's case, Judge Gertner, the sentencing judge, was aware of the
Bureau's policy and decided to depart from the statutorily prescribed
sentence. Judge Gertner instead imposed a sentence of three years
probation, with ten months of home confinement, in which Bakeas
could leave his apartment only for work, religious observance, or
medical care. In doing so, Judge Gertner imposed a sentence that was
similar to what a non-alien defendant would have received for the
same crime.
Did Judge Gertner have the discretion under the
Sentencing Guidelines to make this decision?
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("Act") established the
United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") in order to
compose and administer the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"). The Guidelines are a complex punishment formula
based on a number of factors relating to the crime and the criminal in
volved.3 The Act represents an attempt by Congress to introduce a
more uniform sentencing system for defendants convicted of federal
crimes.4 Congress, however, anticipated that despite the need to pun
ish criminals in a proportional and just fashion, it would be impossible
to predict all of the relevant factors and circumstances that attend

2. 18 U.S.C. § 656 {1994 and Supp. IV 1998).
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 {codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 356166, 3571-74, 3581-86; 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-98 (1994)).
4. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-5 3 (1983); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.
1, pt. A, at A3, p.s. (1998) [hereinafter "USSG"; all references are to the November 1998
version unless otherwise indicated]; Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299,
308 n.34 (1996) ("The Senate Committee characterized this reduction in disparity among
similarly situated defendants as a 'primary goal of sentencing reform.' "). See generally
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58
U. cm. L. REV. 901 (1991).
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each individual case.5 No formula, no matter how complex, could al
ways arrive at the proper punishment range for every case. Recog
nizing this, Congress expressly provided for departures from the pre
scribed sentence, to be exercised at the discretion of the district court
judge.6
Departures from the Guidelines, however, must be relatively in
frequent in order to attain the desired goals of a uniform system of
punishment
if departures were the rule, and not the exception, the
Guidelines would fail to reduce sentencing disparities. Consequently,
the discretion of sentencing judges to depart has been limited, to some
extent, by Congress7 and the Commission. A sentencing judge is ex
pressly forbidden from considering factors, relating to the criminal or
the crime itself, as a basis for a departure.8 Others are expressly men
tioned as potential bases for departure.9 Still many other factors are
-

5. See S. REP No. 98-225, at 52-53 (1983); Gelacek et al., supra note 4, at 301.
.

6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The text of section 3553(b) reads:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection
(a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.

The legislative history reveals that the departure provision was meant to account for cases
that the Commission did not fully anticipate:
[T]he provision provides the flexibility necessary to assure adequate consideration of cir
cumstances that might justify a sentence outside the guidelines. A particular kind of circum
stance, for example, might not have been considered by the sentencing commission at all be·
cause of its rarity, or it might have been considered only in its usual form and not in the
particularly extreme form present in a particular case.

S. REP

.

No. 98-225, at 142 (1983).

Although many departure factors, such as a voluntary confession, are connected to the
moral blameworthiness of the defendant for the criminal act, some are not. The Guidelines
explicitly recognize that a factor may justify a downward departure even though it has noth
ing to do with moral blameworthiness. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.

7. Congress's restrictive approach to departures is evident in the Sentencing Reform
Act. First, Congress required judges to state in open court the reasons for a departure from
the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1994). Additionally, Congress provided for ap
pellate review of sentencing courts' decisions to depart. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994).
8. The complete list of forbidden bases for departure is: race, sex, national origin, creed,
religion, socio-economic status, see USSG § 5Hl.10, p.s., lack of guidance as a youth, see
USSG § 5Hl.12, p.s., drug or alcohol dependence, see USSG § 5Hl.4, p.s., and economic
hardship, see USSG § 5K2.12.
9. The explicitly mentioned bases for departure fall into two categories: encouraged
and discouraged. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) [For a complete discus
sion of the facts and holding in Koon, see infra Part II.]. Encouraged factors are those that
the Commission explicitly recognized that it was unable to take into account adequately in
formulating the Guidelines. See id. at 94. Although the presence of an encouraged factor
does not always justify a departure, see id. at 94-95, this explicit recognition implies that the
Commission expected such factors to lead to departures in many cases. Examples of en
couraged bases for downward departure are: voluntary disclosure of the offense to authori
ties, see USSG § 5K2.16, p.s., and diminished capacity, see USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. In contrast,
discouraged factors are those that the Commission has determined are "not ordinarily rele
vant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
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not mentioned in the Guidelines - either intentionally or because the
drafters did not consider them.10 One unmentioned factor that some
courts have considered as a basis for departure is the defendant's in
eligibility for prerelease confinement programs due to the defendant's
status as a deportable alien. Although the Guidelines forbid the use of
race and national origin as a basis for departure,11 they do not mention
the defendant's alienage, or the consequences of the defendant's
status as an alien for confinement conditions.12
Under Federal Bureau of Prisons policy, deportable aliens are
generally ineligible for lower-security confinement programs, such as
halfway houses, which give the prisoner greater freedom and the abil
ity to carry on a more normal life.13 Presumably, the Bureau's policy is

range." USSG ch. 5, pt. H, intro. cmt.; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 95. The Guidelines in
struct that discouraged factors are only relevant if "such characteristic or circumstance is
present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the 'heartland' cases covered
by the guidelines." USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. The Guidelines define "heartland" as a "set of typi
cal cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes." See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, at
4(b). Examples of discouraged bases for downward departure are: family ties and responsi
bilities, see USSG § 5Hl.6, p.s., and educational or vocational skills, see USSG § 5Hl.2.
10. See USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. (noting that all the factors justifying departure could not be
listed comprehensively and providing that unmentioned factors "may warrant departure
from the guidelines, under some circumstances, in the discretion of the sentencing court.").
11.

See supra note 8.

12 See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
"[n]ational origin, i.e., having been born in a particular country . . . is not synonymous with
'alienage,' i.e., simply not being a citizen of the country in which one is present." ); see also
United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (agreeing with the distinction used
in Restrepo).
13. The Federal Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") is the executive agency responsible for
assigning federal prisoners to specific confinement facilities. The Bureau makes decisions
concerning the security level of incarceration and eligibility for lower security confinement,
including prerelease programs. In doing so, the Bureau evaluates several factors, including
the prisoner's escape history, behavior problems while incarcerated, and history of violence.
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Program Statement 5100.07,
ch. 7, at 4 (1999). Congress has instructed the Bureau of Prisons to ensure that most prison
ers have the opportunity to spend the last portion of their sentences in Jower security con
finement or in community confinement programs (halfway houses). See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)
(1994). For the relevant text of section 3624(c), see infra text accompanying note 23.
Halfway houses are privatized confinement facilities within the community that provide
the inmate with the opportunity to be employed in the community and participate in other
structured programs outside of the confinement facility. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Program Statement 7310.04 (1998). In accordance with
Congress's instructions, the Bureau has made halfway houses widely available to federal in
mates. Between October 1998 and September 1999, 74.7% of federal inmates released from
prison were sent to halfway houses for the last portion of their sentences. See Telephone
Interview with Jane Rhoades, Program Analyst, Bureau of Prisons (Mar. 17, 2000). The Bu
reau, however, has set three requirements for a deportable alien to participate in these pre
release programs, which make this opportunity essentially unavailable for aliens. Those re
quirements include verified strong family ties in the United States, a verified history of
domicile in the United States (five or more consecutive years), and a documented or verified
history of stable employment in the United States. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7,
at 34; see also Smith, 27 F3d at 651 n.2 (noting that these requirements make it essentially
impossible for aliens to qualify for prerelease programs). An alien who fails to meet these
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based on the belief that an alien who knows he or she will be deported
upon release from prison will be more likely to attempt an escape than
other inmates.14 As a result of the Bureau's policy, deportable aliens
often face objectively harsher confinement conditions than the aver
age citizen defendant, all else being equal.15 Some courts have recog
nized these harsher conditions of confinement and have, therefore,
acknowledged alien status as a basis for a downward departure.16 For
example, in United States v. Smith,11 the defendant, Renford George
Smith, was a deportable alien convicted of unlawful possession of co
caine base with intent to distribute.18 The district judge imposed the
minimum sentence available in the sentencing range prescribed by the
Sentencing Guidelines, given the relevant factors present in the case,
but indicated that she would have liked to reduce the sentence even
more.19 Although Smith argued that the court should depart down
ward to reduce the sentence further, the judge declined to depart,
stating: "I really don't see any basis for departure."20 On appeal,
requirements will be denied access to these programs unless the requirements are either vol
untarily waived by the Regional Director of the Bureau, or the Immigration and Naturaliza
tion Service ("INS") has determined that it will not initiate a deportation hearing against the
inmate. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651 n2. Conversely, if the INS has ordered the alien to be de
ported following incarceration, the alien will be denied access to community confinement
even if he or she meets these three requirements. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7,
at 4.
14. Although Program Statement 5100.07 does not expressly state the reasons for the
special treatment of deportable aliens, the three requirements for an alien to get an excep·
tion to the ordinary level of incarceration, enumerated at supra note 13, suggest that the
threat of escape, with its accompanying defeat of the alien's eventual deportation, was a cen
tral concern. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655 (suggesting that flight risk was the rationale underly
ing the Bureau's denial of access to prerelease programs to deportable aliens). In addition,
the risk of escape is a crucial factor in Bureau decisions respecting the level of incarceration.
See BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, at 4-5.
15. The phrase "all else being equal" refers to the circumstances of the crime and the
criminal history of the defendant. In other words, it envisions an identical case with the ex
ception that the defendant is not a deportable alien.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring the
sentencing court to consider a departure on the basis of alienage when the defendant's alien
status causes an increase in the objective harshness of confinement conditions); Smith, 27
F.3d at 649 (same); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 47-49 (D. Mass. 1997) (follow
ing Farouil and Smith, and departing downward on the basis of the defendant's alien status).
17. 27 F.3d at 649.
18.

See Smith, 27 F.3d at 650.

19.

See Smith, 27 F.3d at 650.

20. Smith, 27 F.3d at 650. The D.C. Circuit recognized that the district judge's language
was ambiguous, and could have meant that "she had authority to depart but the circum
stances did not warrant departure." Smith, 27 F.3d at 650 n.1. The court, however, assumed,
for the purposes of the opinion, that the language meant that the judge thought she lacked
authority to depart. Smith, 27 F.3d at 650 & n.1. In a recent opinion, Judge Sentelle (the
dissenter in Smith) discussed the effect of ambiguous statements, such as these, and argued
that they should usually be interpreted as an indication that the judge could not, in good
conscience, depart on a given factor. Judge Sentelle, therefore, did not interpret the state-
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Smith argued that the district judge improperly refused to consider
that Smith would be subject to harsher conditions of confinement than
an otherwise similarly situated American citizen who had been con
victed of the same crime.21 Smith pointed out that he would "almost
certainly [be] ineligible for the benefits of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).'722 That
provision requires the Bureau of Prisons,
to the extent practicable, [to] assure that a prisoner serving a term of im
prisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the
last 10 per centum of the term . . . under conditions that will afford the
prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the pris
oner's re-entry into the community.23

The D.C. Court of Appeals noted that the Bureau of Prisons regula
tions make it nearly impossible for a deportable alien to qualify for
such favorable prerelease programs.24 The court held "that a down
ward departure may be appropriate where the defendant's status as a
deportable alien is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the severity
of his sentence."25 Since the district judge's statement that she did not
see any basis for departure could have been interpreted as indicating
that the judge felt that she lacked authority to depart on such a basis,
the court reversed and remanded for resentencing.26
ment "I don't have any alternative" as a misunderstanding of the judge's ability to depart
from the Guidelines. See In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir.1999).
21.

See Smith, 27 F.3d at 650.

22

Smith, 27 F.3d at 650-51 (citing 18 U.S.C. 3624(c) {1994)).

23. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (1994).
24.

See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651; see also supra note 1 3.

25. Smith, 27 F.3d at 655. "Fortuitous" is probably the last word that an alien defendant
would use to describe this situation. Perhaps a more accurate description would be: an in
crease in the severity of sentence, which is unconnected to guiltiness or any other justifiable
basis for increasing the severity of punishment. The cases on this subject, however, use the
shorthand phrase "fortuitous increase in the severity," see, e.g., Smith, 27 F.3d at 655, which
should be read as emphasizing the "chance" or "randomness" with which the increase in se
verity applies to alien defendants, rather than the "good luck" of the defendants. The key
point is to distinguish these cases from the situation in which a defendant's status as an alien
is a relevant factor in detemiining his "guiltiness," and therefore, his punishment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gonzalez-Portillo, 121 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Smith
because the defendant was convicted of illegal reentry into the United States, a crime that
can only be committed by aliens, and therefore the Commission must have taken alien status
into account when setting the Guidelines range for this offense); United States v.Ebolum, 72
F.3d 35, 38-39 (6th Cir.1995) (same).
26. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 656. The court, however, noted that some limitations should be
placed on sentencing courts considering a departure on the basis of alienage, in order to en
sure that such departures remain the exception, and not the rule. The court stated:
For a departure on such a basis to be reasonable the difference in severity must be substan
tial and the sentencing court must have a high degree of confidence that it will in fact apply
for a substantial portion of the defendant's sentence. Finally, as the defendant's status as a
deportable alien is by no means necessarily unrelated to his just des[s]erts, even a court con
fident that the status will lead to worse conditions should depart only when persuaded that
the greater severity is undeserved. Thus the court will fulfil the Guidelines' command that
such departures will be "highly infrequent."

1326
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Other federal courts have rejected this approach. These courts
have stated that anticipation of harsher conditions of confinement,
stemming solely from a defendant's status as a deportable alien, may
never serve as the basis for a downward departure.27 For instance, in
United States v. Restrepo,']J!, the Second Circuit vacated a district court's
imposition of a sentence that was based partly on a downward depar
ture in anticipation of the alien defendant's ineligibility for halfway
houses or other minimum security facilities. The Restrepo court rea
soned that Congress gave the Bureau of Prisons discretion over the
placement of inmates, and altering a sentence in anticipation of a
harsh placement would amount to an encroachment on the Bureau's
discretion.29
A 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Koon v. United States, ad
dressed departures from the Guidelines and held that appellate courts
could not categorically proscribe a factor as the basis of a departure
unless that factor was explicitly forbidden from consideration by the
Guidelines.30 Although the tension between the Supreme Court's
statement in Koon and the cases rejecting departures on the basis of
alienage is apparent, the Koon case has failed to resolve the issue. Al
though several federal courts have read Koon as implicitly overruling
Restrepo,31 others have continued to follow Restrepo and have refused
to depart on the basis of alienage.32

Id. at 655. These limitations serve an important function, and should alleviate many of the
concerns that other courts have had concerning such departures. See infra Section I.B &
Part III.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, No. 97-4090, 1998 WL 390176 (4th Cir. June 23,
1998) (maintaining that alien status alone is an inappropriate basis for departure); United
States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that increased harshness in the con·
ditions of confinement stemming from alien status is not a proper basis for a downward de
parture); Martin-Camacho v. United States, No. 96 CR 0475(SJ), 1998 WL 352313
(E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1998) (explicitly following Restrepo and rejecting Smith); Tsang v.
United States, No. 97 CIV. 1886 (CSH), 1997 WL 630182 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997) (same).
28. 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993).
29. See Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 645-46.
30. 518 U.S. 81, 106-07 (1996) ("Thus, for the courts to conclude a factor must not be
considered under any circumstances would be to transgress the policymaking authority
vested in the Commission.").
31. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997) (viewing Koon as
resolving the issue in favor of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Smith); United States v. Angel
Martinez, 988 F. Supp. 475, 483 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); see also United States v. DeBeir, 186
F.3d 561, 569 (4th Cir. 1999) (considering departures on the basis of alienage and noting, in
dicta, that Koon "clarified that a district court is free to consider any factor not prohibited by
the Guidelines").
32. One court of appeals and a number of district courts have relied explicitly on
Restrepo in holding that a defendant's status as a deportable alien is not an appropriate basis
for departure, even after the Koon decision. See Gregory, 1998 WL 390176 at *6; Martin
Camacho, 1998 WL 352313 at *2; Tsang, 1997 WL 630182 at *2.

Sentencing Equality for Deportable Aliens

March 2000]

1327

This Note argues that district court judges should not be categori
cally prohibited from departing on the basis of alienage. Instead, they
should have discretion to depart downward from a prescribed sen
tence on the basis of a defendant's status as a deportable alien, when
that status results in a "fortuitous" increase in the severity of the sen
tence. Part I of this Note argues that departures on the basis of alien
age in anticipation of harsh conditions of confinement are consistent
with Congress's charge to the Commission, Congress's intent in en
acting section 3624, and with the Guidelines themselves. Part II ar
gues that the Supreme Court's decision in Koon and a recent amend
ment to the Guidelines prohibit categorical rejections of bases for
departure that are not specifically forbidden by the Guidelines, and
that the Supreme Court and the Commission would, therefore, allow
such departures in some cases. Part III of this Note argues that equal
ity in sentencing and effective use of judicial discretion mandate that
appellate judges defer to the discretion of district judges who depart
downward on the basis of alienage in appropriate cases. Specifically,
Part ill concludes that aliens and citizens have substantially equal
rights under criminal law, and that district judges should therefore be
allowed to depart on the basis of a defendant's status as a deportable
alien when that status adversely affects the defendant's conditions of
confinement.

I.

THE PRE-KOON ANALYSIS: ALLOWING DEPARTURES
ON THE BASIS OF ALIENAGE IN ANTICIPATION
OF HARSH CONFINEMENT CONDffiONS

This Part argues that, even absent the Supreme Court's pro
nouncement in Koon, the Guidelines should be interpreted to permit a
downward departure on the basis of alienage in order to offset the
harsher conditions of confinement faced by aliens who are not eligible
for prerelease programs. Section I.A shows that the term "mitigating
circumstances," as used in Congress's charge to the Commission, may
be interpreted to include alienage, because to do so would remain
consistent with Congressional intent. Section L B argues that depart
ing in anticipation of an alien's harsh conditions of confinement is a
legitimate use of the departure tool for sentencing judges, since judges
depart to offset other prospective conditions. Finally, Section L C re
sponds to the argument that Congress never intended aliens to benefit
from the programs described in section 3624 and concludes that, ab
sent evidence of an intent to treat aliens more harshly, a departure is
warranted to offset the disparate confinement effects stemming from
section 3624.

1328
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A. Alienage As a "Mitigating Circumstance"
The starting point for the consideration of alienage as a mitigating
circumstance is the text of the departure provision, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b).33 According to that provision, alienage must be either an
"aggravating or mitigating circumstance" in order to be a valid basis
for departure from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.34 Courts allowing
for departure on the basis of alienage have determined that it can
sometimes be a mitigating circumstance.35 This conclusion, however,
is not beyond question. At least one judge has argued strenuously that
alienage, as an offender characteristic, should never be considered a
mitigating circumstance.36 This Section demonstrates that alienage can
be a mitigating circumstance under the Guidelines, by showing that
such an interpretation is consistent with the congressional directive to
the Commission.
A complete view of the legislative directive to the Commission re
veals that Congress may have intended for offender characteristics, in
cluding alienage, to sometimes qualify as "mitigating circumstances."
The text of the departure provision, section 3553(b), does not state
expressly that offender characteristics should be included as mitigating
circumstances.37 Evidence from portions of the congressional directive
to the Commission, however, supports the proposition that Congress
did envision offender characteristics as potential mitigating circum
stances. Most revealing is 18 U.S.C. § 994, which lists a number of of
fender characteristics (not including alienage) as potential factors in
determining the appropriate sentence, and instructs the Sentencing
Commission to determine whether or not those factors were rele-

33. See text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), supra note 6.
34. In 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), Congress expressly allowed sentencing judges the discretion
to depart from the Guidelines on the basis of "aggravating or mitigating circumstances" that
were not adequately taken into account by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines.
35. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 651-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (arguing that alien
age can be a "mitigating circumstance"); see also Farouil, 124 F.3d at 846-47 (generally fol
lowing the Smith approach); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 47-49 (D. Mass. 1997)
(same).
36. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 657-69 {Sentelle, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Commis
sion did not intend for alienage to be considered a mitigating circumstance). Offender char
acteristics should be distinguished from offense characteristics. The former refer to attrib
utes of the defendant himself, such as: age, education, physical condition, family ties,
criminal history, and community ties. The latter refer to attributes of the crime itself, such
as: whether the victim died, whether a weapon was used, and whether the defendant con
fessed to the crime. See generally USSG § lBl.1; United States v. La Bonte, 520 U.S. 751,
764-65 (1997).
37. See text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), supra note 6.
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vant.38 The list of characteristics in section 994 is not exclusive,39 and
therefore it is reasonable to assume that other offender characteristics
may also be mitigating circumstances.40
The Commission's response to section 994 is found in Chapter 5,
Part H of the Guidelines, which states that the offender characteristics
listed in section 994 are "not ordinarily relevant" to the decision to
depart, but may, in "exceptional" cases, be relevant to that decision.41
The Guidelines further "make[] plain that [these offender characteris
tics] may be a basis for departure even in circumstances where their
connection to the sentence has nothing to do with moral blameworthi
ness."42
This text from the Guidelines suggests that, in the Commission's
view, some offender characteristics may be used as the basis for depar
ture, albeit only in unusual cases. Although alien status is not specifi
cally mentioned as one of the offender characteristics that might be
relevant, the Sentencing Commission's statement in the Guidelines
Manual, Chapter 1, Part A shows that the Commission did not intend
to prohibit departure for alien status. This portion of the Guidelines
Manual reads:

Section 5Hl.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio
Economic Status), § 5Hl.12 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar
Circumstances), the third sentence of § 5Hl.4 (Physical Condition, In
cluding Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse), and the last sentence of
§ 5K2.12 (Coercion and Duress) list several factors that the court cannot
take into account as grounds for departure. With those specific excep
tions, however, the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of fac
tors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could
constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. 43

As this statement makes clear, the mere fact that alienage is not
mentioned in Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines is not sufficient evi-

38. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994). This section directs the Commission to "consider
whether the following matters, among others, with respect to a defendant, have any rele
vance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sen
tence. . .." 28 U.S.C.§ 994(d). Congress's list of factors in§ 994(d) consists mostly of of
fender characteristics, such as age, education, vocational skills, physical condition,
community ties, family ties, and criminal history. Section 994(d) further directs the Commis
sion to "take [these factors] into account only to the extent that they do have relevance." 28
u.s.c.§ 994(d).
39. This is clear from the inclusion of the phrase "among others" in the statute. See 28
U.S.C.§ 994{d), supra note 38.
40. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651-52 (noting that ten of the eleven items listed in§ 994{d) are
offender characteristics).
41. See USSG ch. 5, pt. H, intro. cmt. {1998). The Guidelines seem to equate "excep
tional" or "unusual" cases with those cases falling outside the "heartland" of cases. See su
pra note 9 for a complete discussion of the "heartland" concept.
42 Smith, 27 F.3d at 652.
43. USSG ch. 1, pt. A at 4{b) (1998) (emphasis added).
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dence to conclude that the Sentencing Commission has determined
that it is always irrelevant. Under the Guidelines, therefore, a defen
dant's status as an alien is an offender characteristic that may be con
sidered by the sentencing court. Alien status, thus, stands in stark con
trast to factors such as race and national origin,44 which are expressly
forbidden. The conclusion, then, that alien status may be considered
as a mitigating circumstance (and hence the basis for a departure) in
certain, limited circumstances is consistent with Congress's directive to
the Commission.
Upon concluding that alienage could be a mitigating circumstance,
the Smith decision held that sentencing courts have the discretion to
depart on the basis of alienage.45 The court, however, limited such de
partures to cases in which the alien faces a substantially more severe
sentence over a substantial portion of his sentence, due to his alien
status, when that status is unrelated to his just desserts. In such an
"unusual"46 case, alienage is a relevant factor that was not considered
by the Commission in drafting the Guidelines, and therefore, a down
ward departure is well within the discretion of the sentencing judge.
One criticism that has been levied against this conclusion is that it
inappropriately relies on Congress's charge to the Commission in 28
U.S.C. § 994. For example, the dissent in Smith stated that

28 U.S.C. § 994(d) has nothing whatsoever to do with mitigating circum
stances under 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(b). 28 U.S.C. § 994 was the charge to the

Sentencing Commission setting out the scope of its undertaking.... That
section is not directed to the sentencing of defendants, but rather toward
the creation of a set of guidelines, which are then to be the framework
for sentencing defendants.47

In other words, the dissent maintains that the nonexclusive list of fac
tors in section 994 is an inappropriate place to look for the definition
of "mitigating circumstances" as used in section 3553(b), since section
994 was simply a directive to the Sentencing Commission and not a
definitional provision.
The Smith dissent, however, mischaracterizes the effect of section
994. Neither this Note nor the courts allowing for departures on the
basis of alienage argue that section 994 defines the phrase "aggravat44. See supra note 12 for the distinction between national origin and alienage.

45. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655.
46. The court in Smith noted that the limitations it provided, see supra note 26, would be
sufficient to keep such departures "highly infrequent." Even if most aliens will meet these
limitations and be eligible for such a departure, (which is not at all clear, see supra note 26),
this does not offend the Commission's desire for departures based on unmentioned factors
to be unusual. The Commission recognized that it did not foresee all potential mitigating
and aggravating circumstances. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The case of aliens
who are ineligible for halfway houses may simply be the sort of case that was unusual
enough to be overlooked by the Commission in setting the Guidelines for most offenses.
47. Smith, 27 F.3d at 658 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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ing or mitigating circumstance."48 Rather, this Note demonstrates that
treating alienage as a mitigating circumstance is consistent with
Congress's directives, given the Commission's approach to offender
characteristics in section SH. Section 994 illustrates that Congress an
ticipated that some offender characteristics might be relevant to sen
tencing and, therefore, directed the Commission to consider a number
of them to determine whether they were relevant and to incorporate
them into the Guidelines accordingly.49
The dissent continues by arguing that Congress's directive in sec
tion 994 was met by the Commission's treatment of the characteristics
in Section SH, and that there is, therefore, no basis for a court to rely
on this directive to interpret the phrase "mitigating circumstances."50
In other words, since Congress only instructed the Commission to con
sider each of a number of factors in section 994, once the Commission
decided how to treat each factor under section SH, section 994 lost any
value in aiding the interpretation of other relevant provisions. This
argument, however, overlooks the reality that the end result of the di
rective of section 994 was not only section SH, but the entire frame
work of the Guidelines as a whole. That the Sentencing Commission
chose to forbid only a few factors from departure consideration re
flects the method that the Commission thought would be most appro
priate in meeting Congress's directive. By including some offender
characteristics in section SH, and by clearly stating that no factors are
forbidden other than those expressly named in the Guidelines, the
Commission made it clear that unmentioned offender characteristics
may be considered mitigating circumstances and serve as the basis for
a departure. The Smith decision demonstrates the consistency of this
approach with Congressional intent by pointing to section 994 simply
to show that Congress realized that some offender characteristics
might be relevant to sentencing and should, therefore, be incorporated
into the Guidelines' overall scheme.51
A second argument against treating alienage as a mitigating cir
cumstance is that each of the factors listed in section SH were declared
48. The majority in Smith never claims that§ 994 determines the definition of "mitigat
ing circumstances." Rather, the majority notes that the Commission has interpreted that
phrase to include some offender characteristics, and that the Commission's interpretation is
not an unreasonable one, given Congress's indications in§ 994. Specifically, the majority's
argument is that: "The first question is whether§ 3SS 3(b) reaches offender characteristics
not related to culpability....We believe that although the controlling statutes are ambigu
ous on the point, the Sentencing Commission has answered it affirmatively, and that that an
swer is an entirely reasonable reading of the statutes." Smith, 27 F.3d at 6Sl (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).

49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
SO. Smith, 27 F.3d at 6S9 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Commission has car
ried out its statutory charge.... [T]he Commission has determined and specified in§ SH of
the guidelines the extent to which each of several characteristics has relevance....").
Sl. See supra note 48.
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by the Commission to be "not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable Guideline
range."s2 This argument maintains that the Commission's treatment of
the section 994 factors in section SH is an insufficient basis on which to
determine that the Commission has interpreted "mitigating circum
stances" as including some offender characteristics, such as alienage.s3
While it is true that the Commission has declared the offender
characteristics in section SH to be "not ordinarily relevant" to a deci
sion to depart,54 it does not follow that the Commission thought they
would never be relevant to departure. The Commission carefully
framed the use of factors for departing, and specifically declared that
only the factors expressly forbidden were beyond the authority of a
court to consider as bases for a departure. Therefore, although not an
approval of the frequent use of certain discouraged offender charac
teristics, such as extreme age, for departure, section SH does support
an interpretation of "mitigating circumstances" that would include any
offender characteristic not expressly forbidden.
In response to this reasoning, those advancing this second argu
ment contend that such a "nod to the possibility of unforeseen circum
stances" is not sufficient evidence of the Commission's interpretation
of "mitigating circumstances" to command deference from the
courts.ss The Commission's choice of a framework that encourages
some factors, discourages others, and expressly forbids only a few,56
however, should not be thought of as merely a "nod" to the unfore
seen. Rather, such a detailed breakdown of factors shows that a vari
ety of offender characteristics may be relevant in some extraordinary
cases. For this reason, the Commission was careful not to remove
completely consideration of these "not ordinarily relevant" factors
from the authority of the sentencing courts. In keeping with that
framework, this Note only advocates departures on the basis of alien
age in certain, limited circumstances, thus making it similar to factors
that are expressly declared not ordinarily relevants7 (i.e., a "discour
aged" factor58).

52 Smith, 27 F.3d at 660 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting USSG§§ 5Hl.1-5Hl.6).
53. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 660 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
54. See USSG ch. 5, pt. H (1995).
55. Smith, 27 F.3d at 660 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
56. For an explanation of "encouraged," "discouraged," "forbidden," and "unmen
tioned" factors, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
57. In particular, this Note advocates departure under the limitations suggested by the

Smith court. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 9 .
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Departure in Anticipation of Harsh Confinement Conditions

In departing from the Guidelines on the basis of alienage, judges
must anticipate that the alien will face harsher conditions of confine
ment once incarcerated. Initially, such a departure may seem inap
propriate as unduly speculative, since the court is essentially predict
ing where the Bureau of Prisons will place the defendant, and then
sentencing accordingly.59 Some courts, recognizing the "anticipatory"
nature of the departure, have refused to depart on the basis of alien
age.ro These courts primarily are concerned that this anticipatory de
parture may encroach on the authority of other agencies - specifi
cally the Bureau of Prisons, which is charged with the decision
whether a given inmate will be placed in minimum security confine
ment or community confinement.61 The purpose of Section I.B is to
demonstrate the propriety of such a "preemptive" departure. Antici
patory departures often are used by courts in other situations without
serious question. Even if anticipatory departures are not always valid,
they should be upheld in the specific case of conditions of confinement
departures for aliens.
"Encroachments" on the discretion of the Bureau or other prison
authorities have been upheld in other cases involving similar circum
stances.62 In a number of cases, federal courts have upheld departures
in anticipation of Bureau (or other prison authority) actions that
would cause a seemingly "fortuitous" increase in the objective severity
of the sentence.63 For instance, in United States v. Lara, the Second
59. The sentencing court is also necessarily predicting that the Bureau's policy will not
change within the time the alien is sentenced and that the alien would otherwise become eli
gible for the prerelease confinement described in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (1994). Although
prison regulations are more susceptible to change than a statute, there is no indication that
there is any momentum or pressure to change this particular Bureau policy.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993). In Restrepo, the
court reversed the sentencing court's decision to depart on the basis of alienage, relying
heavily on Congress's intent to give the Bureau of Prisons discretion with respect to the ap
plication of 18 U.S.C.§ 3624 (the same confinement provision at issue in Smith) . The Sec
ond Circuit characterized the kind of anticipatory departure embraced by the Smith court as
an "encroachment" on the Bureau of Prison's discretion. See id. at 645; see also United
States v. Sutton, 973 F. Supp. 488 (D.N.J. 1997) (encouraging the Commission to make con
ditions of confinement a forbidden factor, in part relying on Restrepo's characterization of
anticipatory departures as "speculative and inappropriate").
61. See supra note 13 for a description of the Bureau's authority over the placement of
inmates.
62

See United States v. Smith, 27 F3d 649, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

63. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 653-55. These other cases typically involve the offsetting of
potential victimization or potential solitary confinement due to vulnerability. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990) (approving a downward departure where
the district court found that the defendant's small size, his appearance, and his bisexual ori
entation made him extremely susceptible to abuse in prison, and that the only way for prison
officials to protect him would be to place him in solitary confinement); see also United States
v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with Lara that potential for victimization in
prison may be a justifiable basis for departure, but finding insufficient evidence of such po-
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Circuit upheld a departure as a means to offset the probability that
prison authorities would place a particularly vulnerable defendant in
solitary confinement in order to protect him from sexual assault.64 In
United States v. Tucker, the Eighth Circuit agreed that sentencing
courts may depart downward in anticipation of abuse in prison.65
These decisions indicate that, when the policies of the Bureau or other
prison officials are predictable enough to enable the court to foresee a
fortuitous increase in the severity of the sentence for a particular de
fendant, the sentencing court may depart to "offset" the harsh out
come.66
Even if it is not always valid to depart on the basis of an
anticipated event, the specific anticipatory departure at issue in this
Note should be allowed because it is more predictable than other
Bureau decisions. First, departure on the basis of alienage for harsh
conditions of confinement is based on a uniquely certain event - the
denial of access to prerelease programs. The clarity and certainty of
the Bureau of Prisons policy67 make it extremely unlikely that a
deportable alien defendant will be granted access to prerelease
programs. In addition, it would be easy for a sentencing judge to learn
of the alien's circumstances so as to predict with nearly perfect
accuracy whether or not the defendant will meet the Bureau's
requirements for placement in a halfway house.68 This level of
tential for victimization to support such a departure); United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d
525 (2d Cir. 1991) (approving a departure where the defendant had a feminine appearance,
would be susceptible to abuse in prison, and would likely face more severe prison conditions
as a result). In Gonzalez, the Second Circuit stressed that sentencing courts should be able
to depart even before any abuse actually has occurred. See Gonzalez, 945 F.2d at 527.

64. 905 F.2d at 603.
65. 986 F.2d at 280.
66. In addition to these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently granted its approval
to such anticipatory departures in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Although the
full implication of Koon is discussed infra Part II, it should be noted at this point that the
Court upheld the trial court's grant of a dovmward departure in anticipation of the defen·
dants' susceptibility to abuse in prison, which was clearly in anticipation of future events. In
doing so, the Court cited Lara as an example, and noted that, after Lara, the Commission
made "physical . . . appearance, including physique" a discouraged factor. See Koon, 518
U.S. at 107. The Court went on to state that even discouraged factors are not totally re·
moved from the consideration of the sentencing judge as a basis for departure. See id. at
107-09. With respect to the susceptibility departure, the Court affirmed the district court's
decision to depart, which was based on the finding that the defendants were "particularly
likely to be targets of abuse during their incarceration." Id. at 112 (quoting United States v.
Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 788 (C.D. Cal. 1993)). The extraordinarily high degree of probabil·
ity that the defendants would be abused was enough to support the district court's conclu
sion that this was an "unusual" case that the Commission had not considered. See id.
67. The Bureau's policy is stated in BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, supra note 13.
68. The judge simply would need to inquire about whether the INS has declared its in·
tent to deport the alien following incarceration, and whether the alien has the requisite ties
to the community listed in BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, at 3-4, supra note 13. This
makes the determination that the alien will be denied access to a halfway house an easy one.
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certainty is at least greater than that which a sentencing judge could
have about whether or not a given defendant will be abused in prison
- an anticipation that, as noted above, frequently has been upheld as
valid, even by the Supreme Court.69
Second, the departure at issue here can be limited specifically by
the restrictions established in Smith. In Smith, the D.C. Circuit ex
pressly limited departures on the basis of alienage to cases in which
the difference in severity (1) is substantial, (2) will apply for a substan
tial part of the sentence, and (3) is "undeserved."70 These limits act to
prevent a court from encroaching too far on the discretion Congress
granted to the Bureau. As long as the courts granting downward de
partures are restrained by these three requirements, the departures do
not represent an improper threat to the discretion of the Bureau.
C.

Congressional Intent

Critics of anticipatory departures based on alienage argue that
Congress never intended for section 3624 to apply to aliens, since ali
ens will be deported following the completion of their prison term.
These critics rely on the text of section 3624 to contend that the pur
pose of prerelease programs (such as halfway houses) is to give the
prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and "prepare for his re
entry into the community."71 For example, the Restrepo court noted:

Given the focus of § 3624(c) on prisoners who are to reenter the commu
aliens
not be released into the community, did not mean § 3624(c) to apply to
such aliens. Had Congress so stated, a court's disapproval of that policy
choice would not be an appropriate basis for a departure from the
Guidelines . .72
nity, it is arguable that Congress, having instructed that deportable

.

.

At first, this argument seems persuasive, given the inclusion of the
language "re-entry into the community."73 The argument, however,

The determination of whether the alien's status was the only factor that caused that denial,
however, is an altogether different, and much more difficult, determination. For a discussion
of this problem, and how it may affect the number of these anticipatory departures, see infra
note 11 3. United States v. DeBeir, 186 F3d 561 (4th Cir.1999), is an example of a situation
in which the defendant's alienage was not the only factor that caused the denial of access to
a halfway house. In DeBeir, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Smith by pointing out that the
alien defendant in this case was unable to find a halfway house that would take him because
of the nature of his offense (involving the sexual assault of a minor), not because of his alien
status. See DeBeir, 186 F.3d at 569-70.
69. See supra notes 6 3-66.
70. See United States v.Smith, 27 F. 3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir.1994).
71. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.
2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 199 3) (citing 18 U.S.C.§
3624(c) (1988 & Supp.II 1990)).
72

Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 645.

7 3. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(c) (1994).
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has little support in the legislative history of section 3624, and in this
country's historical treatment of aliens.
The legislative history of the provision and the general legal status
of aliens in the United States do not support an interpretation of sec
tion 3624 that would treat aliens more harshly than citizens. To make
this point clear, the counterargument must be fully understood. Es
sentially, the argument is that since Congress meant to exclude aliens
from the benefits of section 3624, the aliens should not get an offset
ting departure. For the counterargument to be persuasive, it must be
true that Congress consciously intended to treat aliens more harshly
than citizens, by not allowing them to be placed in the halfway houses
contemplated under section 3624.74
If Congress actually intended to treat aliens more harshly, it would
have been deviating from the traditional treatment of aliens in the
United States legal system. Although alien status may not rise to the
level of a protected classification, such as race, it is a characteristic that
the Supreme Court has deemed worthy of some level of heightened
scrutiny in constitutional analysis.75 The fact that the Court has
treated alienage as a category warranting some heightened scrutiny
would suggest that Congress would not distinguish lightly between ali
ens and U.S. citizens in a statute. Furthermore, distinctions on the ba
sis of alienage in the specific context of criminal punishment may be
74. An assumption that Congress simply overlooked the disparate effects of§ 3624 on
alien inmates (as one would probably suspect) would not be sufficient to support the coun
terargument. If that were the case, then the critic should not object to a departure by a sen
tencing judge to offset the unintended harsh effects of the statute on alien defendants. In·
deed, the Restrepo court's argument centers on the inappropriateness of a departure that
"palliates" the intent of Congress. See Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 645.
75. The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws distinguishing
between aliens and citizens leave much confusion. The Supreme Court, in 1971, seemed to
adopt a strict scrutiny test for the review of state laws that drew such a distinction. See
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that states may not deny welfare bene
fits to aliens). In 1978, however, the Court began to review such laws more deferentially.
See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding a New York law that prohibited aliens
from being state troopers). In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court applied a def
erential standard to uphold a federal law that conditioned aliens' eligibility for Medicare on
admission for permanent residence and continuous residence for five years. That the Court
has moved toward more deference, especially with respect to federal regulation of aliens,
however, does not make the counterargument persuasive. To the contrary, the simple fact
that alienage has fallen somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis review suggests
that the U.S. legal system is sensitive to discrimination on the basis of alienage. See generally
GERALD GUNTIIER & KA1HLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 720-25 (1997)
(listing alienage among the "other classifications arguably warranting heightened scrutiny,"
and discussing the Supreme Court's decisions). Section 3624, a federal regulation, would
probably have been upheld if it was determined to be not arbitrary or unreasonable, even if
it explicitly denied aliens access to halfway houses. The Court's general skepticism of classi
fications on the basis of alienage, however, would suggest that if Congress meant to classify
on that basis, it would have done so expressly in the statute, or would have at least men
tioned it in the legislative history. This observation is sufficient to undermine the counterar
gument that Congress actually did mean to deny aliens the benefits of§ 3624, even though
the legislative history does not reveal that intent.
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even more susceptible to the scrutiny of federal courts.76 It is difficult
to imagine, therefore, that Congress intentionally would punish aliens
more severely than citizens without any record of such an intent in the
legislative history. To the contrary, at other places in the U.S. Code,
Congress appears to hold a strong conviction that aliens should not be
punished differently than citizens.77
It may well be true that Congress actually intended to treat aliens
differently under section 3624. But if Congress consciously made this
decision, it would be reflected in the legislative history of section 3624.
The history of alien status in Constitutional law would make such a
disparate treatment of aliens a significant legislative move - one that
would not be made lightly. A comprehensive search of the legislative
history of section 3624, however, reveals no debates about such dispa
rate treatment of aliens, nor any other indication that Congress delib
erately decided to treat aliens unequally in light of countervailing pol
icy concems.78 The counterargument simply ignores this gap in the
legislative history and reads into the plain language of the statute an
intent to differentiate between aliens and citizens. Although it may be
possible to imagine compelling reasons for Congress to make such a
differentiation,79 an assumption that Congress so intended is simply
too much of a leap when the resulting interpretation treats aliens dif
ferently than other inmates. In the absence of any concrete evidence,
any ambiguity about Congress's intent in enacting section 3624 should
be resolved in favor of the equal treatment of aliens and citizens.

II.

THE POST-KOON ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION AGREE

To this point, this Note has demonstrated that a departure on the
basis of alienage in anticipation of ineligibility for prerelease programs
is not inconsistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, congressional in
tent, and common law notions about the validity of anticipatory depar
tures. Part II argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1996,

76. See, e.g., United States v.Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1 349, 1 352 (9th Cir.1989) (stating
that giving a defendant a more severe sentence on the basis of national origin and alienage is
a violation of due process rights); United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that sentencing a defendant more severely on the basis of nationality or alien status
is unconstitutional).
77. See 18 U.S.C.§ 242 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), discussed infra note 116, which makes it
a crime to punish aliens more severely on the basis of their alien status.
78. In fact, there is very scant legislative history on the provision at issue. Senate Re
port 98-225 specifically addresses§ 3624(c), and makes no mention of an intention to ex
clude aliens from the benefits of the provision. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (198 3).
79. For instance, Congress could have intended to deny aliens access to halfway house
programs because of a fear that deportable aliens would be more likely to attempt to escape
from them to defeat deportation.
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Koon v. United States,80 should have settled the dispute once and for
all - invalidating the categorical approach to departures in favor of
an approach that affords sentencing judges more discretion. Section
IT.A of this Note argues that the Koon decision reaffirmed a discre
tionary approach to departures, and implicitly overruled decisions that
categorically prohibit departure factors that are not forbidden by the
Guidelines. Section Il.B discusses a recent amendment to the Guide
lines that incorporated Koon, and concludes that the amendment also
endorses the discretionary approach.
A.

The Court's Rejection ofa Categorical Approach to Departures
in Favor ofSentencing Court Discretion

In Koon, the defendants were police officers convicted of "violat
ing [a suspect's] constitutional rights under color of law" during the
arrest of Rodney King.81 The intense media coverage and the anger
felt by the black community in Los Angeles toward the defendants
made Koon a special case - one in which the district court found sev
eral factors that took the case outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines
cases.82 The district court, therefore, departed downward from the
Guidelines on a number of bases, including the officers' susceptibility
to abuse in prison.83 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all
of the bases for departure relied upon by the district judge,84 but the

80. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
81. Koon, 518 U.S. at 88. The district court found the following facts: California High
way Patrol officers saw King, who was intoxicated, speeding on a major freeway and at
tempted to pull him over. They followed him with their lights on and used the loudspeaker
to order him to pull over, but King kept driving. The defendants, Los Angeles Police De
partment officers, joined in the chase. After the police had chased King for about eight
miles, King stopped at a recreation area. The officers ordered King to assume a felony
prone position (lying face down on his stomach with his legs spread and his arms behind his
back). King got on his knees, but did not lie down. When some officers tried to force him
down, he resisted. Defendant Koon then used a taser dart to stun King. King then got up
and charged toward another officer, defendant Powell. Powell then began to beat King with
his baton, knocking him to the ground. The defendant officers continued to beat King with
batons to prevent him from getting up. For several seconds after the officers no longer con
sidered King to be a threat, the defendant officers continued to beat King with batons and
stomp on him Much of the beating was caught on videotape and shown repeatedly on na
tional news programs. Four of the officers were tried in state court, and all were acquitted of
all charges except for one charge against defendant Koon that resulted in a hung jury. The
announcement of the verdicts in the widely-publicized case sparked civil unrest in Los
Angeles. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 85-88.
.

82 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 89-90. For the definition of "heartland," see supra note 9.
83. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 89-90. The other bases for departure employed by the district
judge were the victim's misconduct that provoked the offense, the likelihood that the officers
would lose their jobs and would be prevented from future employment in law enforcement,
the fact that the officers had been subject to successive state and federal trials, and the low
risk of recidivism. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 89-90.

84. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 90.
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Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's treatment of some of
these bases for departure.85 In so holding, the Koon decision provided
a useful analytical framework for evaluating the propriety of depar
tures from the Guidelines, stating:

If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court cannot use
it as a basis for departure. If the special factor is an encouraged factor,
the court is authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not al
ready take it into account. If the special factor is a discouraged factor, or

an encouraged factor already taken into account by the applicable
Guideline, the court should depart only if the factor is present to an ex
ceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the
ordinary case where the factor is present. . . If a factor is unmentioned in
.

the Guidelines, the court must, after considering the "structure and theory
of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a
whole, " . . . decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guide
line's heartland.86
The Koon Court clearly emphasized that deference should be
given to district courts in Sentencing Guidelines' departures on
unmentioned factors, and disapproved of the district court's depar
tures only where there was a clear abuse of discretion.87 The Court
further stressed that courts of appeals have a limited role in the
evaluation of unmentioned factors as potential bases for departures.
The Court disapproved of the Ninth Circuit's categorical rejection of
"susceptibility to prison abuse" as a factor that can serve as the basis
for departure.88 The Court plainly stated that appellate courts could
not determine that this particular factor was always an inappropriate
basis for departure, since such a holding would be to "transgress the
policymaking authority vested in the Commission."89 The Koon deci-

85. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 91. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its dis
cretion in departing on the basis of the victim's misconduct. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 105. Fur
thermore, the Court stated that the district court could appropriately consider susceptibility
to abuse in prison and the successive prosecutions as factors for departure. See Koon, 518
U.S. at 111. The Court, however, found that the district court abused its discretion in con
sidering the career losses of the defendants, because that is clearly an expected consequence
of the crime of violating 18 U.S.C. § 242, which prohibits a governmental authority from
violating a person's rights. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 110. It is important to note that the Court
concluded that the Commission must have considered this expected factor only after recog
nizing that the district court deserved deference on this question. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 110.
The Court also disapproved of the district court's consideration of low risk of recidivism,
given that the Commission expressly dealt with that specific factor in the Guidelines. See
Koon, 518 U.S. at 111.
86. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting United States
v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1993)).
87. See supra note 85.
88. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 106-09.
89. Koon, 518 U.S. at 107 ("By urging us to hold susceptibility to abuse in prison to be
an impermissible factor in all cases, the Government would have us reject the Commission's
considered judgment in favor of our own.").
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sion, therefore, emphasized the importance of the sentencing court's
discretion in deciding whether to depart based on unmentioned fac
tors.
Although the Koon holding did not address expressly the circuit
split regarding alienage as a basis for departure, the framework that
the Koon decision implemented for departure jurisprudence speaks to
the conflict. The Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed the discretion
ary approach e�bodied in Smith by approving of discretionary depar
tures based on an unmentioned factor.90
Ineligibility for favorable conditions of confinement due to deport
able alien status is not mentioned in the Guidelines.91 According to
the Koon decision, the district court must, therefore, consider the
structure and theory of the relevant individual guidelines and the
Guidelines as a whole to determine whether it is sufficient to take the
case out of the heartland.92 The Supreme Court noted that this is a
fact-specific inquiry that district judges are better situated to resolve
than appellate judges.93 The discretionary approach properly ac
knowledges this fact by giving the district judge discretion to deter
mine whether or not the consequences of a defendant's status as a de
portable alien based on conditions of his confinement could be an
appropriate basis for departure in that particular case.94 In short, the
discretionary approach refuses to categorically prohibit departures
based on an alien's ineligibility for prerelease confinement programs.95
This discretionary approach recognizes the limited role of appellate
courts in departure jurisprudence, as envisioned by the Koon decision.
It allows sentencing judges to determine whether or not a factor is
present that the Commission did not consider adequately and that
takes the case out of the heartland, without intrusive review from ap
pellate courts unfamiliar with the facts of each case. The Koon deci
sion, therefore, indicates the Supreme Court's implicit approval of the
discretionary approach to departure jurisprudence that would allow
downward departures on the basis of alienage in limited circum
stances.

90. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
91. See generally USSG (1998); United States v. Romero, No. Crim. 97-388(JBS), 1998

WL 690010, at *15 (D.NJ. Sept. 25, 1998) (noting that "a deportable alien's ineligibility for
pre-release confinement under § 3624(c) is not mentioned in the Guidelines
in table by United States v. Romero 193 F.3d 515 (1999).

•

.

.

"), reversed

.

92 See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
93. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-99 (noting that "[d)istrict courts have an institutional ad
vantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see
so many more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do").
94. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that "a
downward departure may be appropriate where the defendant's status as a deportable alien
is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the severity of his sentence . . . .")
.

95. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655-56.
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In contrast to the Smith court's discretionary approach, the
Restrepo decision holds that downward departures on the basis of an
alien defendant's likely ineligibility for prerelease programs under sec
tion 3624 are inappropriate.96 This categorical prohibition of an
unmentioned factor is erroneous in the wake of Koon. Koon teaches
that an appellate court should allow district courts discretion in de
tennining whether a factor (other than a prohibited factor) present in
a given case takes the case outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines
cases.97 For an appellate court to rule that ineligibility of aliens for a
section 3624 prerelease program never takes a case out of the heart
land is inappropriate in light of the Koon Court's statement that such
a categorical prohibition would be an usurpation of the Commission's
authority.98
Many federal courts have disagreed with the foregoing interpreta
tion of Koon's impact in the context of departures for the conditions
of confinement faced by deportable aliens. Most of these courts have
simply adhered to the categorical Restrepo approach without discuss
ing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Koon.99 At least
one federal district court has gone further, expressly declaring that
Koon does not overrule Restrepo. In United States v. Holguin, the
court held that Restrepo was good law, despite the Koon holding.100 In
a footnote, the court addressed the tension between the cases:

First, Koon does not discuss the precise factor of deportable alien status
at all. Second, Koon merely gives the district courts a framework within
which to consider factors not specifically mentioned in the Sentencing
Guidelines. The holding in Koon does not go so far as to implicitly over
rule decisions like that in Restrepo. Rather, Koon reminds district courts
of their discretion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) to depart only if "the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described."101
The two arguments advanced by the Holguin court are deficient.
First, the fact that Koon did not deal specifically with deportable alien
96. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]e conclude that
none of the bases relied upon by the district court, i.e., (1) the unavailability of preferred
conditions of confinement . . . justified the departure."); see also Romero, 1998 WL 690010,
at *15 ("Restrepo ruled out the prospect of a downward departure based solely upon an
alien's typical ineligibility for pre-release confinement . . . .").
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying text
99. See, e.g., Martin-Camacho v. United States, No. 96 CR 0475(SJ), 1998 WL 352313, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1998); Tsang v. United States, No. 97 CIV. l886(CSH), 1997 WL
630182, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997).
100. See United States v. Holguin, 16 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Md. 1998).
101. Holguin, 16 F. Supp. at 600 n.2 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (citing § 3553(b))).
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status is irrelevant. The Supreme Court did not limit its analysis to the
specific factors involved in the Koon case. Quite the contrary, the de
cision clearly stated that no factor is ruled out unless the Guidelines
specifically prohibit consideration of the factor.102 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court carefully described a procedure for considering
unmentioned factors, which demonstrates the Court's acute awareness
that the opinion would be used as a guide for the consideration of
other unmentioned factors that might later become the subject of de
parture jurisprudence.
The second argument of the Holguin court is equally unpersuasive.
Simply put, the Koon decision does not "merely" provide a framework
for district courts to consider unmentioned factors. Rather, the Koon
opinion goes further by discussing the limited role of appellate courts
in reviewing district court departure decisions.103 The Holguin court
apparently overlooked the Supreme Court's declaration that no factor
may be categorically ruled out by an appellate court, except for the
factors expressly prohibited by the Commission.104
Less creative federal courts have simply declared that compara
tively harsh conditions of confinement due to alien status is an inap
propriate basis for departure, relying on the Restrepo precedent, and
ignoring the effect of the Koon decision.105 For example, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Gregory, decided after Koon,
adopted a categorical rule that "illegal alien status, alone, is an inap
propriate basis for departure."106 These courts erroneously deny dis
trict courts the discretion to determine, under the facts of their indi
vidual cases, whether or not that factor may be an appropriate basis
for departure. According to Koon, such a denial of discretion is im
proper and counterproductive.107 Only those district courts that care
fully consider the structure and theory of the Guidelines can appropri-

102 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 109 ("We conclude, then, that a federal court's examination
of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining
whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor.
If the answer to the question is no
as it will be most of the time - the sentencing court
must determine whether the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances, takes the
case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline.").
-

103. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. In fact, there is an entire section of the opinion devoted
to the general standard of appellate review for departure determinations. See Koon, 518
U.S. at 96-100.
104.

See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

105.

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

10 6. United States v. Gregory, No. 97-4090, 1998 WL 390176, at *6 (4th Cir. June 23,
1998} (rejecting, without any explanation other than a cite to Restrepo, the defendant's ar
gument that he should get a downward departure since he will be incarcerated in a maxi
mum security facility and ineligible for community confinement due to his alien status).
107. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (noting the "institutional advantage" of district courts in
making the determination of whether a factor is present in "some unusual or exceptional
way").
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ately deny a departure on the basis of alien status and its impact on
confinement.108 To the extent that any federal appellate court claims
to exclude categorically, as a basis for departure, any factor that has
not been prohibited from consideration by the Guidelines, such as al
ienage,109 that court's decision is irreconcilable with Koon, and is
therefore unsound.
B.

The 1998 Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines

A 1998 amendment to the commentary to section 5K2.0 of the
Guidelines, which expressly incorporates the Koon holding, demon
strates that both the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Congress have
embraced the discretionary approach. The new amendment reads, in
pertinent part:
The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in reviewing a
district court's decision to depart from the guidelines, appellate courts
are to apply an abuse of discretion standard, because the decision to de
part embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by the sentencing
court. Koon v. United States
. "[To determine whether a case falls
outside of the heartland,] the district court must make a refined assess
.

.

.

ment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage
point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing. Whether a given
factor is present to a degree not adequately considered by the Commis
sion . . . [is a matter] determined in large part by comparison with the
facts of other Guidelines cases. District Courts have an institutional ad
vantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations,
especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate
courts do."110

This amendment quotes extensively the key language from the Koon
case. The amendment makes clear the Sentencing Commission's
adoption of the Koon holding and its approval of the limited role for
appellate courts in departure jurisprudence described in the court's
opinion. No courts considering the types of departures at issue in this
Note have discussed the effect of the new amendment to the Guide
lines. Presumably, however, courts like the Fourth Circuit in Gregory
and the District Court for the District of Maryland in Holguin would
not change their decisions, since they do not see Koon as a barrier to
categorical rejection of alienage as a basis for departure.111 If, as the
Holguin court argues, Koon does not implicitly overrule Restrepo,
then there is no reason to think that the amendment does either.

108. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
109. Alienage is not one of the few factors prohibited as a basis for departure by the
Guidelines. See supra note 8.
110. USSG § 5K2.0 cmt. (1998) (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 98).
111. See supra notes 100-101, 106 and accompanying text.
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If, as this Note has argued, the Koon decision implicitly overrules
Restrepo, then the amendment to the Guidelines places the Commis
sion's stamp of approval on the discretionary approach. After the
amendment, any courts that continue to follow Restrepo's categorical
proscription of an alien's ineligibility for prerelease programs as a ba
sis for departure would not only ignore Supreme Court precedent, but
will also ignore the express will of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
and Congress, as expressed in the new amendment.
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALLOWING DEPARTURE ON THE
BASIS OF ALIENAGE

Part ill argues that the independent policy goals of equal punish
ment and trial court discretion justify departures on the basis of alien
age in anticipation of harsh conditions of confinement. Section III.A
shows that such departures ensure that aliens are treated the same as
other inmates. Section ID.B argues that trial courts should be given
more discretion to fashion appropriate sentences for individual defen
dants - including granting departures on the basis of alienage.
A.

Equal Treatment for Alien Defendants

Allowing for downward departures to compensate illegal aliens for
facing objectively more severe conditions of confinement results in
equal treatment of citizen and alien defendants who are otherwise
similarly situated. The Bureau of Prisons' Policy Statement contains
special requirements, applicable only to aliens, that must be met in or
der to gain eligibility for minimum security or community confine
ment.112 As a result, most alien defendants will face objectively
harsher conditions of confinement than a comparable citizen defen
dant, based on their alienage.113 An approach to sentencing that al112 See supra note 13.
113. See supra notes 13, 23 and accompanying text. It is important to note, however,

that it may be difficult, in some cases, to identify alienage as the factor that actually caused
the increased severity of confinement conditions. Since there are a number of variables in
the Bureau's determination of placement of an inmate, it will often be difficult to isolate the
alienage variable as the cause of the disparity. In the words of the Smith court, "in trying to
assess whether deportable alien status per se will really affect assignment, it may be hard to
identify an otherwise identical citizen to serve as a benchmark." United States v. Smith, 27
F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Smith court, however, went on to note that, under some
circumstances, the effect of the alienage factor is clear:
[I]f a deportable alien is assigned to a more drastic prison than otherwise solely because his
escape would have the extra consequence of defeating his deportation, then the defendant's
status as a deportable alien would have clearly generated increased severity and thus might
be the proper subject of a departure.

Smith, 27 F3d at 655. Thus, in cases like Peter Bakeas's, there is little question that a simi
larly-situated citizen "benchmark" would have been treated differently. The only factor that
would have caused the difference in the Bureau's placement of Bakeas and the hypothetical
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lows a trial judge sufficient discretion to counteract this disparity in
certain cases would serve to balance the severity of punishment on
otherwise similarly situated alien and citizen defendants.114 This bal
ancing is desirable, because the idea of equal treatment for similarly
situated defendants was central to the creation of a uniform system of
sentencing guidelines.115 The desirability of equal punishment for ali
ens and citizens is underscored by criminal law. As one judge and
scholar has noted, "[i]ndeed, it is a crime to punish an alien differently
than a citizen merely because of alienage. "116
Critics of departure for alienage will respond by arguing that a de
parture does exactly that - it unjustifiably punishes an alien differ
ently than a citizen solely on the basis of alienage. These critics claim
that departing on the basis of alienage will cause the alien to receive a

citizen defendant was alien status. It is in cases like these that the Smith court thought de
partures would be necessary, but the court recognized that these type of cases might be
"quite rare." Smith, 27 F3d at 655. Cf United States v. DeBeir, 186 F3d 561 (4th Cir.
1999}, discussed supra note 68.
114. For an analysis of the validity of such "anticipatory" offsetting departures, see

pra Section I.E.

su

115. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l}(B) (1994} (charging the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
achieve "certainty and fairness" through a reduction in "unwarranted sentencing dispari
ties"); USSG, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt., at 1-2 (Nov. 1993) (stating Congress's goals as includ
ing proportionality for "similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders."). See also
Bruce M Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance Depar
tures in Combatting Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1994} (describing the
"thinking," including uniformity concerns, that motivated the promulgation and adoption of
the Guidelines); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Depar
ture Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3-5
(1991} (noting the goal of eliminating discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other
variables as one of the objectives of the Guidelines).
116. Arthur L. Burnett Sr., National Origin and Ethnicity in Sentencing, 9 CRIM. JUST.,
Fall 1994, at 28 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994)). Section 242 states, in relevant part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects
any person . . . to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). In addition to this criminal violation, it appears that such differential
punishment is a violation of an alien's Constitutional rights. See supra note 75. The key
point here is that the different punishment cannot be assessed solely on the basis of alienage.
If, however, a noncitizen's alienage is otherwise relevant in determining an appropriate
sentence, then the punishment would not be based purely on alien status. For example, a
Columbian drug smuggler justifiably may be treated differently because of his connection to
Columbia in a case where he is shown to have been involved in drug smuggling operations
and repeat violent offenses in Columbia. There, the basis for a sentencing enhancement
would not be simply alien status, but rather an attempt "to incapacitate drug smuggling
operations and to deter drug smugglers from sending violent criminals to the United States."
Burnett, supra, at 28 (describing the facts of United States v. Escobar, 803 F. Supp. 611
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)). Another example of when aliens can be treated differently is when their
alienage relates directly to their culpability, as when the alien is convicted of illegal reentry
into the United States. See supra note 25 and infra note 124.
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more lenient sentence than a citizen simply because of his or her status
as an alien.117
This argument, however, focuses too narrowly on the isolated deci
sion to depart by the sentencing judge. It fails to take notice of the
disparity that is caused by a different, later decision - the one that is
guided by the Bureau of Prisons. The Bureau's policy is to treat aliens
differently than citizen defendants. Therefore, the truly equal treat
ment of aliens and citizens can be accomplished only by taking alien
age into consideration at another step in the punishment process namely, the sentencing decision. Thus, the sentencing judge's decision
offsets the Bureau's later unequal treatment, resulting in more equal
punishment overall.118 In light of this equalizing effect, the argument
that a departure would unfairly treat aliens differently is short-sighted.
A second response to the equal punishment justification for depar
tures, similar to those employed in Smith, is that alienage is not an ir
relevant factor. Proponents of this argument maintain that a defen
dant's status as an alien is an important consideration in determining
the appropriate punishment for the defendant.119 This implies that the
Bureau of Prisons is justified in creating the difficult requirements for
alien defendants to become eligible for preferred conditions of con
finement.
The most likely justification for such disparate treatment is that the
Bureau suspects that many aliens are escape threats, due to the depor
tation that awaits most alien prisoners at the end of their sentence.120
The Bureau may consider that the escape of an alien defendant would
have the additional consequence of defeating his deportation. In light
of this concern, alienage would not seem to be irrelevant in determin
ing eligibility for minimum security or community confinement.
There are three problems with this reasoning. First, courts should
recognize that the Bureau is simply using alien status as a proxy for
117. See United States v. Onwuemene, 933 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1991) (characterizing
a downward departure on the basis of alienage in anticipation of harsh confinement condi
tions as "sentencing an offender on the basis of [alienage]" in violation of the Constitutional
prohibitions described supra note 76).
118. Of course, the sentence of the citizen defendant and the alien defendant who re
ceives a departure will not be identical. They will simply be "more equal" than they would
be without a departure. In some cases the departure will give the alien what appears to be a
lesser sentence than what a citizen defendant would have received. In other cases, however,
the departure may not be sufficient to fully offset the harsh effects. In Bakeas, for example,
the sentencing judge thought that the home confinement would still be harsher than what a
citizen defendant would have received, but noted that "it is as close as the current Bureau of
Prisons policy allows me to come in implementing the sentence the guidelines envisioned for
this crime and this offender." United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D. Mass.
1997).
119. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1993).
120. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655 (noting that the three requirements listed in the Bureau's
Program Statement, see supra note 13, "suggestO that ineligibility stems primarily from the
greater likelihood of escape").
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the variables that are actually relevant, and so alienage will not corre
spond perfectly with the risk of escape.121 Second, even if aliens are
more likely than citizens to be escape threats, that reasoning only jus
tifies keeping alien prisoners out of lower security confinement pro
grams; it does not go so far as to justify a categorical rejection of
Smith-type departures. Allowing a judge to depart in some cases to
counteract the harsh conditions disparity caused by the Bureau will
not necessarily undo any escape-prevention effect that is intended and
justified. Generally, if a departure is granted, the alien prisoner will
still serve his entire sentence in higher security conditions, but the
overall length of the incarceration would be decreased to compensate
the prisoner.122 The risk of escape, and the resultant defeat of deporta
tion, is still kept to a minimum, but the alien defendant will not serve
an objectively harsher sentence to accomplish this goal.
A third flaw in this reasoning is that it ignores the limitations on
departures due to alienage. According to the departure scheme de
vised by the Smith court and advocated by this Note, departures would
only be appropriate when there is no connection between the defen
dant's alienage and the blameworthiness of the defendant.123 The
Smith court stated: "[A]s the defendant's status as a deportable alien
is by no means necessarily unrelated to his just des[s]erts, even a court
confident that the status will lead to worse conditions should depart
only when persuaded that the greater severity is undeserved."124 Thus,
when the defendant's status is relevant to his punishment, such as
when he is convicted of illegal reentry into the United States, the

121. As the Smith court notes, it may be appropriate to take the Bureau's three consid
erations (family or community ties, stable employment, and five years of residence in the
U.S.) into account, given their effect on flight risk. Using alien status as a proxy for these
factors, however, may cause an alien to be assigned to "a more drastic prison than otherwise
solely because his escape would have the extra consequence of defeating his deportation.''
Smith, 27 F3d at 655. In such a case, a departure may be appropriate. See id.
122. Although the Smith and Restrepo courts do not acknowledge explicitly that a de
parture would likely affect the length of the confinement, not the conditions, this notion
seems to underlie the reasoning employed by both courts. The Bakeas case described in the
Introduction differs from this norm, in that the judge's departure allowed Mr. Bakeas to be
placed in home confinement, rather than just shortening his stay in a medium security
prison. See Bakeas, 9'01 F. Supp. at 51.
123.

See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.

124. Smith, 27 F.3d at 655. It is clear, for instance, that a court should not depart to off
set harsh conditions when the alien has been convicted of illegal reentry into the United
States. Such a defendant would present a flight risk, since he has tried to defeat deportation
before, and may be likely to do so again. Courts consistently have distinguished these cases
from Smith, however, and have denied departures. See United States v. Gonzalez-Portillo,
121 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Because deportable alien status is an inherent ele
ment of the crimeO
this factor was clearly 'taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelineO' . . . and was accounted for in the offense level it
established . In [Smith], however, the defendant had been sentenced under a guideline
that did not already take his deportability into consideration.'' (citation omitted)); United
States v. Ebolum, 72 F.3d 35, 38 (6th Cir. 1995) (using a similar analysis).
• . .

.

.

.
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Commission likely will have considered alien status, and a departure
on that basis would be inappropriate.

B.

Trial Court Discretion in Fashioning Sentences

A categorical approach, like the one employed in Restrepo, that
prohibits sentencing judges from departing based on an alien defen
dant's likelihood of facing harsher conditions of confinement, creates
limitations on the discretion of trial courts that would decrease the
quality of sentencing results. Such restrictive appellate court review of
sentencing decisions precludes trial judges from tailoring sentences
appropriately to individual crimes and individual defendants.125
An appellate court ruling that prevents district courts from de
parting on the basis of alienage where the alien defendant faces
harsher conditions of confinement would replace the trial court's
sound exercise of discretion with the categorical view that such a cir
cumstance can never justify a departure from the Guidelines. Such a
view is not only contrary to what Congress and the Sentencing Com
mission intended,126 and contrary to what the Supreme Court has an
nounced regarding departure jurisprudence in Koon, 127 but also tends
to lead to sentences that are not narrowly-tailored to fit the defen
dant's crime and circumstances.
A trial court has several advantages in determining whether or not
to depart. First, the trial court is familiar with the specific facts of each
case, whereas the circuit court only has access to the official record.128
Second, the trial court judges see many more Guidelines cases than
their appellate counterparts. Third, trial courts hear more ordinary
cases, while the appellate courts are likely to hear mostly atypical
cases, since those are the ones that generally will present issues for ap
peal.129 These factors make the trial court better at determining
whether or not the factors involved in a specific case are sufficiently
unique, or are present to a sufficient degree, to take the case outside
125. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) ("Congress did not intend, by es
tablishing limited appellate review, to vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over
district court sentencing decisions."); see also Gregory N. Racz, Note, Exploring Collateral
Consequences: Koon v. United States, Third Party Hann, and Departures from Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1462, 1470-71 (1997) (noting Koon's rejection of a
de novo standard of review due to a need to give "substantial deference to the district court's
application of the Guidelines to the facts of each case").
126.

See supra Part I.

127.

See supra Part II.

128. See Racz, supra note 125, at 1470-71 ("As one appellate judge stated: 'We do not
see or hear the witnesses or the defendant. . . . We do not see real people in their struggle to
live, only abstract people - 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants,' 'appellants' and 'appellees,' 'peti
tioners' and 'respondents.' ' ") (quoting United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 514 (6th Cir.
1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting)).
129.

See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993).
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the "heartland" of Guidelines cases.130 That is, the trial court is in a
much better position to make case-specific determinations regarding
the validity of departures from the Guidelines.131 As the Supreme
Court stated in Koon, and at least one circuit court has also noted, the
decision whether or not a case is within the "heartland" is exactly the
kind of determination that trial courts have an advantage over appel
2
late courts in making.13
A common response to calls for more trial court discretion in de
partures from the guidelines is that such a course would return the
sentencing process to the relative chaos that inspired the formulation
and adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines.133 This response, however
persuasive it may be in regard to departures generally, overlooks the
limitations on a trial court's discretion to grant this type of departure.
Specifically, the limitations enumerated by the Smith court and advo
cated by this Note will ensure that such departures are granted only in
"unusual" cases, thus preserving the desired uniformity of the Guide
lines.134 These limitations will serve as guidance to the lower courts,
rather than a broad categorical appellate pronouncement that this
specific type of departure is never warranted.135 These limits serve to
keep the number of departures based on conditions of confinement
relatively low. Indeed, the framework outlined by the Smith opinion
would not defeat the uniformity goal of the Guidelines, but rather

130. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (1996). But see Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule
of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake
of Koon v. United States, 58 Omo STATE L.J. 1697, 1731-45 (1998) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's reliance on the argument that trial courts have an "institutional advantage"
was flawed).

131. See Racz, supra note 125, at
"makes sense" in sentencing questions).
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(noting that deference to the district courts

132 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98; Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951.
133. See supra note 4.
134. The D.C. Circuit held that trial courts may depart on the basis of objectively
harsher conditions of confinement, but emphasized that those courts should only do so when
the difference in conditions is substantial, applied for a significant part of the sentence, and
is undeserved. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
135. It could be argued, however, that any appellate limitations on departures that are
unmentioned in the Guidelines are actually categorical rules if you define the category more
narrowly. For instance, one could claim that the D.C. Circuit's statement that the difference
in conditions should be undeserved is a categorical rule against downward departures for
aliens who will be confined under harsher conditions, but whose alien status causes them to
deserve a harsher penalty. This, however, stretches the definition of a "factor," as used in
the Guidelines, too far. Certainly harsh conditions of confinement are accepted as a poten
tially relevant factor (although unmentioned in the Guidelines) for consideration, but the
more narrow, hypothetical category described above does not seem to fit the Commission's
view of a "factor," given the factors that the Commission actually mentions in the Guide
lines, such as having been abused as a child or vulnerability to attack in prison.
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would "fulfil the Guidelines' command that such departures will be
'highly infrequent.' m36
Restrepo represented a categorical declaration that harsh condi
tions of confinement based on the fortuity of alien status could never
take a case outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines cases.137 Such an
approach by an appellate court negates the institutional advantages
that make a trial court uniquely suited to make departure decisions.
In contrast, the Smith court's discretionary approach would take ad
vantage of those institutional efficiencies.
CONCLUSION

This Note has shown that appellate courts should refuse to pro
scribe categorically, as a basis for downward departure from the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, the fact that a defendant will face objectively
harsher conditions of confinement based solely on the fortuity that the
defendant is a deportable alien. Not only does such a proscription in
trude upon the trial court's sentencing discretion, which was expressly
preserved by the Supreme Court in Koon, but it also results in objec
tively unequal sentences - exactly what the Guidelines were meant to
minimize. In cases where the sentencing judge is confident that an
alien defendant will face substantially more severe confinement condi
tions than a similarly situated citizen, over a substantial portion of his
sentence, and where the judge is also confident that this inequality is
undeserved, she should have the discretion to depart downward to off
set that undeserved severity. Punishing aliens more severely, simply
because they are aliens, is illegal and perhaps unconstitutional. The
Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, must be interpreted to give sen
tencing judges the discretion to depart on the basis of alienage where
alien status causes a fortuitous increase in the severity of the sentence.
In light of this conclusion, Judge Gertner's decision to grant Peter
Bakeas a downward departure was an appropriate one.

136. United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting USSG, ch. 1, pt.

A, § 4(b) (1992)).
137.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

